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CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: LONG LIVE ROCK... AND
THE FIRST AMENDMENT
Sex, drugs, and rock and roll in the city of Burbank? Never! swore
Councilman James Richman. But after the Ninth Circuit's decision in
Cinevision Corp. v. City of Burbank,' the sex and drugs are optional but
the rock and roll is here to stay.
The Ninth Circuit affirmed a district court decision, and held that
the City of Burbank and Councilman Richman violated the first amend-
ment's freedom of speech provision by denying Cinevision Corp.
("Cinevision") the right to promote concerts in the Starlight Bowl be-
cause such concerts were considered "hard rock."2 The Council and
Richman could not avoid liability by claiming legislative immunity from
Cinevision's civil rights action because the Council and Richman's ac-
tions were considered by the court to be executive actions rather than
legislative. The Council and Richman, though, could not even enjoy the
qualified, limited, immunity afforded to executive actions because they
admittedly acted in bad faith toward Cinevision, and bad faith actions
extinguish the protections of limited immunity.3
In 1975, Cinevision entered into a five year contract with the city of
Burbank to promote live entertainment during the summer in the Star-
light Bowl ("Bowl"), a municipally owned amphitheater.4 The contract
gave the Council the right to exclude performers or performances, if the
nature and content of the act had the potential of creating a public nui-
sance or unlawful behavior.5 Cinevision had the contractual right to
confer with the Council over an excluded performer or performance, but
the decision of the Council, at least according to the contract, was final
and binding.6
Cinevision presented concerts at the Bowl during the summers of
1975 through 1978. 7 In the summers of 1977 and 1978 Councilman
Richman openly disapproved of all the Cinevision concerts.8 Cinevision
1. 745 F.2d 560 (9th Cir. 1984).
2. Id. at 565-66.
3. Id. at 577.
4. Id. at 565.
5. Id. The contract stated in pertinent part that "[t]he City shall have the right to disap-
prove and cancel any show or performance which has the potential of creating a public nui-
sance or which would violate any State law or City ordinance."
6. Id.
7. Id.
8. Id.
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proposed eight concerts for the summer of 1979.9 The Council rejected
all but two performers'0 because the remaining artists played "hard
rock" music and this would attract an "undesirable" crowd to the city of
Burbank. "
Cinevision filed suit against the City and Richman in the Federal
District Court for the Central District of California under 42 U.S.C. sec-
tion 1983, claiming a violation of its first amendment rights by the City
and Richman. 12 Richman was sued because he was a member of the City
Council and because of his blanket opposition since 1977 to any concert
Cinevision proposed. Cinevision claimed that Richman's acts consti-
tuted "wanton, willful, malicious, or oppressive conduct."' 3 The jury
found that the City and Richman had violated Cinevision's first amend-
ment rights and awarded compensatory damages of $20,000 against both
the City and Richman, and a $5,000 punitive damage award against
Richman. 14 Cinevision was awarded $119,228 in attorneys' fees pursu-
ant to 42 U.S.C. section 1988,15 which allows for attorneys' fees to the
"prevailing party" in a civil rights action.
In affirming the district court's holding, the Ninth Circuit reasoned
that since a promoter is a vital link, or conduit, in bringing to the public
the protected expression of the artist, the promoter's ability to promote
should garner the same first amendment protection as does the protected
expression of the artist.16
With this concept, Judge Reinhardt extended the first amendment
principles found in Young v. American Mini Theaters, 7 and applied
those principles to the rock promoter. The Cinevision court cited Justice
Powell's concurring opinion in Young, which noted that "[t]he central
First Amendment concern remains the need to maintain free access of
the public to the expression."' 8 Without the promoter, artists would not
9. Id. at 566. The proposed artists were: Jackson Browne, Todd Rundgren, Roxy Music,
Robert Palmer, Poco, Al Stewart, Patti Smith, and Blue Oyster Cult.
10. Robert Palmer and Poco.
11. Id. The undesirables were narcotics users.
12. Id.
13. Id.
14. Id. In City of Newport v. Fact Concerts, Inc., 453 U.S. 247, 271 (1981), the United
States Supreme Court held that a municipality is immune from punitive damages under
§ 1983; therefore, punitive damages could not be imposed upon the City.
15. Cinevision, 745 F.2d at 581. Section 1988 provides, in relevant part, that in a 1983
action, "the court, in its discretion, may allow the prevailing party, other than the United
States, reasonable attorney's fees as part of the costs."
16. Id. at 567-68. See also Fact Concerts, Inc. v. City of Newport, 626 F.2d 1060, 1063
(1st Cir. 1980).
17. 427 U.S. 50 (1976).
18. Cinevision, 745 F.2d at 568, citing Young, 427 U.S. at 77.
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be able to convey to the public their protected expression. By furthering
the rights of the promoter, the rights of the artist are indirectly
preserved.
Cinevision attorney Bert H. Diexler declared that "the ruling of the
Ninth Circuit represents a victory not only for concert promoters but for
concertgoers because it bars government entities from closing theaters to
keep out groups based on content."' 9 This is an important observation.
The Cinevision decision fortified the position that the first amendment
protects not only the right to provide expression but also the right to
receive such expression. This concept was articulated by the United
States Supreme Court in Virginia State Board of Pharmacy v. Virginia
Citizens Consumer Council.2" The Court stated that "[f]reedom of
speech presupposes a willing speaker. [W]here a speaker exists . . . the
protection afforded is to the communication, to its source and to its re-
cipient both.""1 Thus, the Cinevision ruling fortifies the protection of
expression, given and received, and makes the logical extension of pro-
tecting the promoter's rights because it is the promoter that makes the
expression available.22
In answering the City's claim that the Bowl was not a public forum,
the Ninth Circuit found that publicly owned property used for a variety
of expressive activity is considered a public forum. Government entan-
glement in the origination and operation of the facility thereby subjects
government regulation to the constraints of the first amendment.2 3 Once
limited by the first amendment, the City could not then exclude an indi-
vidual or group without a compelling governmental interest to override
the first amendment's protections.2 4 Arbitrary factors such as political
views and the makeup of the audience do not provide a sufficiently com-
pelling governmental interest to overturn a performer's first amendment
rights.2 5
With regard to the public forum issue, attorney Diexler may be
19. Jackson, Concert Promoter is Backed by Court in Burbank Dispute, L.A. Daily Journal,
Oct. 22, 1984, at 1, col. 5.
20. 425 U.S. 748 (1975).
21. Id. at 756.
22. The court's decision to uphold the first amendment rights of a promoter is not a
landmark decision but a logical extension of the Supreme Court's decision in Joseph Burstyn,
Inc. v. Wilson, 343 U.S. 495, 501-02 (1952), which established that a promoter enjoys a first
amendment right to promote for profit.
23. Cinevision, 745 F.2d at 569. See also L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
§ 12-21 at 689 (1978).
24. Cinevision, 745 F.2d at 569, citing Perry Education Ass'n v. Perry Local Educators
Ass'n, 460 U.S. 37, 45 (1983).
25. Cinevision, 745 F.2d at 577.
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overly optimistic in his belief that the Cinevision ruling keeps the govern-
ment from shutting down theaters in order to carry out content-based
exclusion of groups. The Cinevision court recognized that "although a
state is not required to indefinitely retain the open character of the facility,
as long as it does so it is bound by the same standards as apply in a
traditional public forum."26 With this, the Ninth Circuit conceded that
the government could terminate the "open character of a facility,"
thereby contradicting Diexler's absolute assertion. The court, however,
failed to state when, and under what circumstances, such a termination
could occur.
The question of when the government can eliminate the open char-
acter of a facility27 is apparently a crucial question regarding content-
based exclusion because it determines the status of the facility as either a
public or non-public forum. The difference between the status of being a
public forum as opposed to being a non-public forum is, however, errone-
ously thought to be significant. "In a non-public forum, the government
is free to exclude speech or speakers based upon the content of the
message, except in cases of viewpoint discrimination."28 The difference
in status, however, is actually not significant for purposes of content-
based exclusion. The United States Supreme Court has noted that a gov-
ernmental restriction, even in a non-public forum, will be upheld only if
it is content-neutral.29 Thus, the City's vigorous argument that the Bowl
was not a public forum3" was moot since the same first amendment con-
straints would have applied to the Bowl whether it was a public or non-
public forum.
The Cinevision court determined the Bowl's public forum status by
looking to the Supreme Court's definition of a public forum in Perry Ed-
ucation Association v. Perry Local Educator's Association.3' The Perry
court defined three categories of public forums32 and the Cinevision court
26. Id. at 569 (emphasis added), citing Perry, 460 U.S. at 45-46.
27. The Court in Perry, 460 U.S. at 46 n.7, possibly referred to a change from a public
forum to a limited public forum (a public forum created for a limited purpose) as an elimina-
tion of a forum's open character.
28. Faber and Nowak, The Misleading Nature of Public Forum Analysis: Content and
Context in First Amendment Adjudication, 70 VA. L. REV. 1219 (1984).
29. United States Postal Service v. Council of Greenburgh Civic Ass'ns, 453 U.S. 114, 131
n.7 (1981). See also Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Defense and Educational Fund, 105 S. Ct.
3439 (1985).
30. Cinevision, 745 F.2d at 570.
31. 460 U.S. 37 (1983).
32. Id. at 45-46. The other two categories in Perry are "traditional" public forums such as
streets, parks, and areas historically devoted to assembly or debate; and public forums such as
jails, military bases and other areas not considered forums for public communication.
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found that the second category - "public property which the state has
opened for use by the public as a place for expressive activity" - was
applicable to the Bowl.3"
An inherent difficulty with the Perry definition is that it fails to state
when public property becomes a public forum. The fact that government
owned or operated property is open to the public does not make it a
public forum.34 "[T]he First Amendment does not guarantee access to
property simply because it is owned or controlled by the government."3
The distinguishing element in Cinevision appears to be that the previous
grant of access to the Bowl by the City to Cinevision "[tiransformed pub-
licly owned property into a public forum for expressive activity .. ."36
Implicit in this statement is that since Cinevision had promoted a variety
of acts at the Bowl before, it was established that Cinevision had the right
to promote expressive activity there in the future.
The court's determination about transforming publicly owned prop-
erty into a public forum, questions whether the elevation from publicly
owned property to public forum through the use of expressive activity is
a threshold determination. In other words, was it the use by Cinevision,
alone, that opened up the Bowl to public forum status? That this seems
to be the intention of the court is found in the language that public prop-
erty can become a public forum for expression "even if the expressive
activity is promoted by a single entity."37 As such, Cinevision, a single
entity, opened up the Bowl for use as a public forum.
The court's "single entity" determination is a major weapon for the
promoter, but is also important for an artist or any other person or group
seeking use of a public forum for expressive activities. Granting access to
one entity that provides a variety of expressive activity opens the doors
for others to follow. This may provide an effective block to a municipal-
ity changing a forum's status from public to non-public forum to deny
expressive activity through content-based regulation.
Establishing that the Bowl was a public forum, the court moved to
the issue of whether the government could exclude persons from a public
forum based solely on content regulation. It is generally recognized that
the privileges and protections of the first amendment are not absolute
and do not guarantee the right to communicate one's views at all times
33. Cinevision, 745 F.2d at 570, quoting Perry, 460 U.S. at 45. See also Southeastern Pro-
motions Ltd. v. Conrad, 420 U.S. 546, 563 (Douglas, J. concurring and dissenting) (1975).
34. United States v. Grace, 461 U.S. 171, 177 (1983).
35. Greenburgh, 453 U.S. at 129.
36. Cinevision, 745 F.2d at 570.
37. Id. "Single entity" refers to a single promoter or single group of promoters.
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and places or in any manner that may be desired. 8 While content neu-
tral time, place, and manner restrictions may be reasonable,39 expression
restrictions based on content alone are not allowed.'
Selective exclusion can be allowed only when it is supported by a
compelling governmental interest and is the least restrictive means of fur-
thering that interest. 1 The interests of the City in Cinevision are at best
absurd,42 and the court recognized that those interests in no way justified
denial of access to the Bowl.43 Even if the Council's exclusion was in
good faith and was found to stem from a compelling governmental inter-
est, it still could not be valid because the exclusion was based on the
performers being "hard rock." (Arguably, only two of the proposed
eight groups fit that category.44) It stands to reason then, that a "bad
faith interest,"'45 such as the views espoused by Richman, would never be
compelling enough to overcome first amendment scrutiny.
It is not, simply, that the bad faith of the Council (or some of its
members) determined the non-compelling nature of their interest. A
good faith interest notwithstanding, a general fear of unlawful activity
caused by the playing of "hard rock" music (as the Council feared) is too
broad an interest to justify a content-based expression restriction.4 6 This
is sound reasoning, since to let municipalities show a generalized fear of
38. Heffron v. Int'l Soc'y for Krishna Consciousness, 452 U.S. 640, 647 (1981).
39. Virginia State Board, 425 U.S. at 771.
40. Police Dept. of Chicago v. Mosely, 408 U.S. 92, 95 (1972).
41. Cinevision, 745 F.2d at 571. See also United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 377
(1968).
42. The Council (and especially Richman) was afraid the concerts would bring "sick peo-
ple" to Burbank such as "the dopers and sexual misfits of Los Angeles" and that these people
might corrupt "the youths of Burbank." Cinevision, 745 F.2d at 576 n.20. The humorous flaw
to this argument is that "the dopers and sexual misfits" may very well enjoy the entertainment
the Council wanted promoted, and would come to Burbank to partake of such entertainment,
thereby raising the possibility not only of corrupting Burbank's youths but its adults as well!
43. Id. at 571, 577.
44. Anyone with even the least knowledge of popular music knows the folly of trying to
define rock and roll and its progeny, and yet, several categories of rock and roll are readily
apparent. "Hard rock" is better defined as "heavy metal," the evolutionary form of the 1960's
"acid rock," and is characterized by loud volume, distorted guitars (produced by effects pedals
such as a "fuzz box" or "overdrive"), pulsating bass lines, and hard-driving drum rhythms
emphasizing bass and snare drum combinations. To categorize singers like Jackson Browne
(who has many songs featuring solo guitar or piano), Todd Rundgren, or Al Stewart as "hard
rockers" is as ludicrous as labeling Perry Como or Ella Fitzgerald "hard rockers" as well. Of
all the proposed performers, only Blue Oyster Cult and possibly Patti Smith could be classified
as "hard rock."
45. Id. at 578. Richman did not contest the jury finding of bad faith on his part. The
court also had ample evidence of Richman's bad faith towards Cinevision. Id. at 578 n.25.
46. Id. at 572.
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unlawfulness4 7 as a compelling interest would allow such municipalities
to engage in content-based restriction of expression and discrimination
against certain groups under the guise of a good faith interest in promot-
ing lawful activity. Sufficiently narrow standards for content-based
restriction, insured by judicial scrutiny, help keep a check on municipal
power by limiting unbridled and, in this case, uninformed
decisionmaking.48
Finally, the court took a step that may have been unnecessary. The
court discussed the theory that a municipality may dedicate a public fa-
cility to particular forms of expression in order to provide a greater di-
versity of entertainment in the community. This discussion is gratuitous
because the City never claimed it excluded the proposed acts because
they were not of the specific form of expression for which the Bowl was
dedicated.
The court stated that the exclusiveness of a public forum, when
bona fide, may show the government striving for diversity of entertain-
ment, but noted that the first amendment limits the government's desire
to inculcate certain values at the expense of other protected forms.49
The contention that dedicating a public forum to a certain form of
expression will promote diversity works only if there are several public
forums available. In a community with only one or two public forums,
exclusivity would achieve just the opposite of the court's notion; it would
accomplish exclusion, rather than diversity, and it would harbor
discrimination.
The court noted that availability of other forums for an exclusive
type of expression figures heavily in the decision to dedicate the public
forum to a particular form of expression. 50 "The fact that there are few,
if any, alternative forums for a particular form of expression would tend
to support the municipality's action; restricting the use of the forum
would under these circumstances provide the public with access to ex-
pression it would not otherwise have."'" Again, the court's premise is
flawed. It works only if there are enough forums to go around. If not,
47. Id. at 576-77.
48. This was the same concern sustained by the Supreme Court in Southeastern Promo-
tions, 420 U.S. 546 (1975). There, the Chattanooga, Tennessee, City Council denied the appli-
cation by Southeastern to stage the musical "Hair," because of outside reports that the play
was obscene. None of the Council members had seen the play. Similarly, in the Cinevision
case, it is questionable whether any Burbank City Council members had ever attended a con-
cert by any of the proposed acts.
49. Cinevision, 745 F.2d at 574.
50. Id. at 576.
51. Id.
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the result is the exclusion of some forms of expression. This is exactly
the opposite result arrived at so thoughtfully in this opinion.
The Ninth Circuit's discussion of a municipality's right to dedicate a
public forum to a particular form of expression is unnecessary for the
resolution of the Cinevision case and may actually have dangerous conse-
quences. Such an argument runs the risk of being misused by municipal-
ities to discriminate against protected forms of expression under the guise
of promoting access to a particular form of expression. Such an applica-
tion would undercut the court's holding and send the protections guaran-
teed by the first amendment, regarding the promotion of artistic
expression, tumbling backwards.
The City, in an attempt to avoid liability, claimed that the Council
acted in a legislative capacity and enjoyed full immunity from a civil
rights action.52 This would have been an effective block to liability since
"[m]embers of local legislative bodies [such as the Burbank City Council]
have complete immunity from suits based on their legislative acts."53
The court, however, found that the Council was actually acting in an
executive capacity, by reasoning that the Council's contractual dealings
with Cinevision involved the administration and monitoring of the mu-
nicipal contract, and that these functions constituted ad hoc decision-
making.54 Ad hoc decisionmaking is a characteristic of executive
capacity.55 Since the Council's actions were executive in nature, they
were only entitled to qualified immunity.56 To enjoy qualified immunity,
actions must be in good faith.57 Good faith is defined as "that state of
mind denoting honesty of purpose, freedom from intention to defraud,
and . . . being faithful to one's duty or obligation."5 " "[A] local official
acts in bad faith and 'is not immune from liability for damages under
section 1983 if he knew or reasonably should have known that the action
he took within his sphere of official responsibility would violate an indi-
vidual's constitutional rights.' "" Since Richman admitted that he acted
in bad faith," the Ninth Circuit found he was not immune from liability
for punitive damages under section 1983.6"
52. Id. at 577.
53. Id. (quoting Kuzinch v. County of Santa Clara, 689 F.2d 1345, 1349 (9th Cir. 1982)).
54. Cinevision, 745 F.2d at 580.
55. Id.
56. Id.
57. Id.
58. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 623-24 (5th ed. 1979).
59. Cinevision, 745 F.2d at 578 (quoting Wood v. Strickland, 420 U.S. 308. 322 (1975)).
60. Cinevision, 745 F.2d at 578.
61. Id. at 580. See supra note 4.
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On the issue of attorneys' fees, 42 U.S.C. section 1988 allows the
prevailing party in a civil rights action to recover reasonable attorneys'
fees. 62 The court found that the extent of a party's success was determi-
native of "prevailing" for purposes of section 1988.63 Since Cinevision
won all of its contentions, the court found that it had satisfied section
1988's "prevailing" requirement and was entitled to reasonable attor-
neys' fees. 4
Have other lawmaking bodies received the Cinevision message? In
late 1985, city officials in San Antonio, Texas, were considering an ordi-
nance "intended to inhibit controversial rock or pop attractions from
performing potentially offensive material."6 While promoters and city
officials plan to do battle in the courtroom, the Cinevision case represents
a contemporary and important analytical starting point.
66
For now, Burbank must put up with rock and roll, in all of its myr-
iad forms. It is doubtful, however, that Councilman Richman will ever
be caught singing, "I know it's only rock and roll but I like it ... 67
Robert M. Wilder
62. Id. at 581.
63. Id.
64. Id.
65. Sutherland, One City Mulls Concert Control In Lyric Row, Billboard, Sept. 21, 1985, at
1, col. 5.
66. Id. at 72, col. 6.
67. "Only Rock and Roll," words and music by Mick Jagger and Keith Richards, copy-
right 1974 by Promopub Music.
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